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Diversification first:  
Why the euro area does not need 
an artificial safe asset 
Daniel Gros 
he European Commission has now tabled ‘enabling’ legislation for the creation of ‘SBBS’, 
sovereign bond-backed securities. The official purpose is to allow financial markets to 
create a ‘safe asset’, which should be used by banks instead of government bonds. 
Enabling SBBS is useful, but it remains unlikely that they will be widely adopted. Creating a safe 
asset out of (sometimes) risky government bonds requires a complicated legal structure under 
which a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) issues two new securities, one that would take any ‘first 
loss’ and another, a more senior one, that would be extremely unlikely to ever experience a 
loss. Unfortunately, this approach, which is called tranching, has no track record in the market 
for public debt.  
It is thus highly uncertain whether SBBS will be widely adopted. In order to have a better chance 
of a wider move towards diversification, the Commission should have extended the ‘enabling’ 
approach to existing instruments, namely normal investment funds, which do not involve 
tranching. There already exists many funds that combine euro area government debt in a single 
basket, relying on an existing legal framework, widely used by market participants today. The 
Luxembourg or Irish UCITS (Undertaking in Collective Investments in Transferable Securities) or 
ETFs (Exchange Traded Funds) are leading, globally recognised frameworks for such funds with 
hundreds of billions of euros outstanding and traded. It is difficult to understand why the 
Commission has not extended the ‘look-through’ approach to all funds, which invest only in 
euro area government debt. 
The essence of the Commission’s proposal makes sense: Banking regulation should accord 
equal treatment to direct holdings of (euro area) government debt and holdings of investment 
funds, based only in such debt. Regulation should thus ‘look-through’ the legal structure of 
these funds. But there is little reason why this look-through approach should be applied only 
to SBBSs. Moreover, the Commission also proposes to treat the junior or first-loss tranche of 
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the SBBSs in the same way as government debt (and the senior, safe tranche) is treated. This 
does not make sense since the junior tranche of an SBBS is clearly more risky than a single 
government bond. 
The reason the Commission limited the look-through approach to SBBS is that it thinks that the 
euro area needs a safe asset. This is a highly debatable proposition. The banking system of the 
euro area can be stabilised even without creating a new ‘safe’ asset. The real problem is the 
concentration of risk on bank’s balance sheets in the form of large holdings of bonds of the 
home sovereign. Diversification should be the first priority. But the current regulatory 
framework hinders diversification of sovereign risk because existing investment funds of euro 
area government bonds are treated as if they were much less safe and liquid than the individual 
government bonds themselves. 
The solution thus does not require SBBS. All that is required is that the existing rules followed 
by regulators should be tweaked so that regulated funds that invest only in euro area 
government securities are treated in the same way that the underlying government bonds are 
treated (the look-through approach).  
This applies in particular to two key issues: capital and liquidity requirements. As long as 
government bonds have a zero-risk weight (under the standard Basel approach), euro area 
banks should not have to hold any additional capital on holdings of funds based only on euro 
area government securities. 
The same treatment should also apply to the liquidity cover ratio (LCR), which obliges banks to 
hold a buffer of cash or liquid high-quality securities. Investment funds (or ETFs) of euro area 
government bonds should be put into the same liquidity category as government bonds 
themselves.   
Moreover, as shown in a companion Policy Brief, diversified funds of the debt of many countries 
have a more stable market value than even the safest individual country bond. They should 
thus become the preferred instrument to satisfy liquidity needs. 
A further step could be that funds that contain euro area government bonds in proportion to 
the capital key in the ECB should be recognised as ‘diversified’ and thereby exempted from the 
large exposure limits. 
 
